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I. INTRODUCTION
As far back as David Ricardo's shattering insight as to comparative ad-
vantage in 1817, agriculture has enjoyed special favor in trade.' The unique
place of farming was so well established by the time the 1947 General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was negotiated that GATT's tight disci-
plines on government interference with free trade not only exempted government
protections to growers, but in fact were drafted to be fully consistent with the
agricultural policies of the major signatories? While it would be an exaggeration
to argue that GATT' s first half century was without impact on agricultural bene-
fits, the sector at any rate took center stage during negotiations to create the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") because by the time these talks began in
1986, subsidy-induced overproduction had led to widespread displacement of
efficient producers from their traditional markets.3 Many felt this result was far
from realization of David Ricardo's compelling economic case for the smallest
possible government intervention."
While widely hailed for bringing agriculture, at last, under the
GATT/WTO umbrella, 1995's Agreement on Agriculture ("Agreement on Agri-
culture) more than lived up to the promise of Article 20 that "substantial ... re-
ductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing
process. ''5 Both as to export subsidies-those contingent upon export perform-
* Dr. Schmitz is Ben Hill Griffin Jr. Eminent Scholar and Professor of Food and Re-
source Economics in the University of Florida's Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences. Mr.
Powell is Lecturer in Law and Director of the International Trade Law Program at the University of
Florida's Fredric G. Levin College of Law. Both are Faculty Members in the University's Interna-
tional Agricultural Trade and Policy Center. The authors thank Levin College law student Joshua
Clark for his research assistance and, for their invaluable comments, John R. Magnus, of the Wash-
ington, DC-based international trade and antitrust consulting firm, TRADEWINS LLC; Terence P.
Stewart (assisted by Dan Stirk), managing partner of the preeminent Washington trade law firm,
Stewart and Stewart; and James D. Grueff, United States agriculture negotiator during the Uruguay
and Doha Rounds as the Department of Agriculture's former Assistant Deputy Administrator for
International Trade Policy in the Foreign Agricultural Service.
1. MELAKU G. DESTA, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS 5-6 (2002).
2. THE GAIT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 134 (Terence
P. Stewart ed., 1993).
3. Paul C. Rosenthal & Lynn E. Duffy, Reforming Global Trade in Agriculture, in THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 145, 145 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
4. Ruth Gana Okediji, Symposium on Globalization at the Merging: Perspectives on
Globalization From Developing States: Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspectives, 7
IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 117, 129 (1999).
5. Agreement on Agriculture, art. 20, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round
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ance and, thus, with the most direct impact on export prices and trade-and the
remaining domestic subsidies, the Agreement on Agriculture's ambitions are so
modest that many experts believed its generous exemptions and undefined terms
rarely would permit successful reining in by dispute settlement panels of the
nearly $1 billion a day developed nations provide to their farmers.'
Two decisions issued by WTO dispute settlement panels on September 8,
2004, belie that prediction. Brazil, an agricultural superpower in its own right,
was a complainant in both cases. In the first case, a Panel found United States
subsidies to upland cotton were sufficiently in excess of those granted by the
UNITED STATES during the baseline 1992 marketing year to be actionable un-
der the Subsidies Agreement, despite the protection of the "Peace Clause" of the
Agreement on Agriculture. The Cotton Panel went on to find that these subsidies
caused serious prejudice to Brazil's cotton growers within the meaning of the
Subsidies Agreement.7 In the second case, which involved the EU's Common
Agricultural Policy, a Panel held that the EU had exceeded its agreed commit-
ments on sugar in both the amount of exports and the level of subsidies.'
Not only is Cotton notable as the first WTO decision to find that domes-
tic farm support caused injury, but the report is important because it also con-
cluded that serious prejudice; thus, a WTO violation, was shown by the size and
nature of the government benefits to the cotton industry on the ground that they
caused world prices to be suppressed. United States cotton producers received
$13.1 billion in subsidies during the examined period of 1999 to 2003 for a crop
valued at $13.94 billion in those four years.9 The Panel's conclusions, which
have been upheld by the WTO's Appellate Body, will have significant impact on
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/legal-e.htm [hereinafter
Agreement on Agriculture].
6. See Editorial, Those Illegal Farm Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at A20.
7. See Report of the Panel, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 8.1 (c),
WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratrop-e/dispu e/267r_a_e.pdf [hereinafter Cotton Panel Report].
8. European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar, Reports of the Panels 1 8.3,
WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, & WT/DS283/R (Oct. 15, 2004) (unofficial reports issued to the
Parties Sept. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Sugar Panel Report], aff'd, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AD/R, & WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Sugar AB
Report].
9. In terms of the effect of cotton policy on United States producers, the dollar amounts
of the transfer referred to by the Panel are not the true gain for United States producers. Using
standard cost benefit criteria, the gain in producer welfare from cotton price supports for 2002 was
in the neighborhood of roughly $1.5 billion, while the amount for 2003 was much less at $411
million. Fred Rossi, et al., The Multiplicative Effect of Water Subsidies and Support Payments: The
Case of US Cotton, J. INr'L AG. TRADE & DEV. 55,65, tbl. 7. These estimates are based on the
standard cost-benefit framework outlined in RICHARD E. JUST, ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF
PUBLIC POLICY: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION 572-88 (2004).
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agricultural policies for specialty and program crops of the United States,
Europe, and Japan."° The Sugar Panel's finding that below-cost exports of an
agricultural product may, even in the absence of "direct" export subsidies, show
export subsidization if there is close linkage of domestic support programs with
these exports makes the United States rice, corn, soybeans, and other commodi-
ties programs vulnerable to dispute challenge.
This paper will analyze the major holdings of the Sugar and Cotton deci-
sions from both a legal and an economic perspective, assess the WTO implica-
tions of those holdings on other crops and on Doha Round agriculture negotia-
tions, and examine the effects on other United States exports of the failure of the
United States to implement the decisions separate from Doha Round negotia-
tions.
II. UNITED STATES-CoTrON SUBSIDIES
A. United States Cotton Support Programs as Non-Exempt Subsidies
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("Sub-
sidies Agreement") creates strong prohibitions on export and import-substitution
subsidies (prohibited or "red light")" and on domestic subsidies that injure com-
peting industries (actionable or "yellow light")." Recognizing the place agricul-
ture continues to occupy under trade rules, in the case of both types of govern-
ment programs, the Subsidies Agreement defers to the Agreement on Agricul-
ture. Export subsidies and import-substitution subsides are prohibited, "except as
provided in the Agreement on Agriculture."' 3 As to domestic subsidies, normally
actionable either through WTO disputes or national countervailing duty investi-
gations, an exception is made for "subsidies maintained on agricultural products
as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture," which is the so-
called "Peace Clause" that exempted for the first six years of implementation of
the Agreement on Agriculture agricultural subsidies provided consistently with
the Agreement on Agriculture's terms.'4 The Panel's first task, then, was to
10. See Final Cotton Decision Could Have Major Impact on U.S. Farm Policies, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, June 25, 2004, at 1 (discussing only changes in United States).
11. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 3.1, 3.2, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instru-
ments- Results of the Uruguay Round 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm-01-e.htm [hereinafter Subsidies Agreement]
(defining red light subsidies).
12. Id. at art. 5 (defining yellow light subsidies).
13. Id. at art. 3.1.
14. Id. at art. 5; DESTA, supra note 1, at art. 5.
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evaluate whether United States government benefits to cotton production and
export met the Agreement on Agriculture's requirements. If so, the strictures of
the Subsidies Agreement that govern state aid to all other products would not be
relevant. '
B. Domestic Support
The Panel began with two programs the United States claimed-with ap-
parent acquiescence by other farm country delegations during the Uruguay
Round- were classic "green box" subsidies under Article 13(a) of the Agree-
ment on Agriculture--entirely exempt from reduction commitments because
their receipt was unrelated to whether the farmer planted cotton, and thus have
insignificant impact on cotton trade. To qualify as green box subsidies, the bene-
fit program must meet several criteria. The first and "fundamental" requirement
is that they have "no, or at most, minimal trade-distorting effects or effects on
production."' 6 Such subsidies must provide support solely from publicly funded
government programs that do not involve transfers from consumers. 7 Moreover,
support must be decoupled from both prices and production, and the program
must meet the specific policy conditions set out by Annex 2 as to twelve different
kinds of potentially eligible benefits, such as agricultural research, crop disaster
assistance, income insurance, regional assistance, environmental programs,
farmer retirement, and income support. 8 Even if the program meets all these
conditions, a WTO Member may not claim green box status unless it has notified
the WTO of the program. 9
Green box status carries important benefits to the granting government.
Green box programs are neither subject to reduction commitments nor need be
counted in a Member's Aggregate Measurement of Support in base or subsequent
years, which allows green box payments to grow without affecting the Member's
overall reduction commitment. 0 Most importantly, green box subsidies were
exempt during the implementation period (1995-2003) from both national coun-
tervailing duty investigations and WTO dispute settlement challenges.2'
The two claimed green box subsidies, production flexibility contract
payments ("PFC") and their 2002 successor, direct payments ("DP"), provide
15. See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 7.5.
16. Raj Bhala, World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: The Uruguay Round Agricul-
ture Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round, 79 N.D. L. REV. 691, 784 (2003).
17. Id.
18. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, at Annex 2, 2-3.
19. See id. at arts. 18.2-18.3.
20. Raj Bhala, supra note 16, at 783.
21. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 16, at art. 13.
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support to producers of upland cotton and other commodities based on historical
acreage and yields in order to support farming flexibility and certainty.22 Neither
depends on current prices. 3 To fall into the green box, direct payments to pro-
ducers must be decoupled not only from prices, but payment amounts also must
not be "related to, or based on, the type or volume of production (including live-
stock units) undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period."24 The
Panel noted first that, in general, payment amounts were not related to production
volume or type because program eligibility did not rely on actual production. 5
However, the Panel did not stop at this finding. The Panel noted that the
producer had some flexibility. Payments were not affected if the grower planted
no crop at all, but the majority of producers did plant their acreage and the pro-
grams provided that payments would be reduced if recipients planted fruits and
vegetables or wild rice. 6 Given that fruits and vegetables and the other listed
crops clearly are "types" of production, the fact that producers who planted any
of the "prohibited" crops would find their payments reduced was enough to con-
vince the Panel that payments were not entirely decoupled from production. 7
The Panel's evaluation did not rely on actual use of the land by payment
recipients but on the hypothetical "monetary incentive for payment recipients not
to produce the prohibited crops," which the Panel found could be significant in
certain parts of the country.28 In other words, even though the Panel acknowl-
edged that the amount the producer received would not be affected in any way if
the producer planted cotton, no matter how few or how many acres were grown,
it found that flexibility and direct payments were coupled to production because a
given farmer might grow a listed crop.29 Planting cotton would seem by far the
22. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at I 7.212, 7.218.
23. Id. at 117.214, 7.220.
24. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, at Annex 2, 1 6(b).
25. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 7.383.
26. Id. at 7.384.
27. Id. at 7.384-7.386, 7.388.
28. Id. at 7.386. The Panel cited USDA data showing that twenty-two percent of farm
income in the 17 states producing upland cotton came from the prohibited crops and that this figure
was seventy percent in California, a major cotton producing state.
29. The United States cogently argued that, under this reasoning, a WTO Member could
not even prohibit the planting of opium poppy or other illegal crops, much less environmentally
damaging production or unapproved biotech varieties. The Panel stated this issue was not before it.
Id. at IN 7.360, 7.373. The Appellate Body curtly rejoined that there is nothing to suggest that the
term "production" in paragraph 6 refers to anything other than "lawful" production, suggesting that
the United States could decouple payments from production by making the growing of fruits and
vegetables illegal. Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 340,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body Cotton Report].
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most likely alternative for a cotton producer, particularly one concerned that fu-
ture support programs might be based on recent planting records."
The Panel's finding that PFC and DP payments are coupled with produc-
tion is thus not only theoretical because it is not based on actual use of the land,
but it also relies on testimony by an official of the National Cotton Council that
does not support the Panel's reasoning.' Disqualifying the entire program from
green box treatment for the potential that certain payments could be reduced is a
broad reading of Annex 2's conditions, a step back from the reality of farm pro-
duction, and a short-circuiting of the analytical process demanded by the treaty's
terms.32 The PFC and DP programs thus failed the green box test and had to be
considered with other domestic support under the "blue" or "amber" boxes of
Article 13(b).33
To be exempt from the Subsidies Agreement under Article 13(b) of the
Agreement on Agriculture's Peace Clause, non-green domestic support measures
provided "during the implementation period"' must "not grant support to a spe-
30. The Appellate Body actually turned the likelihood that a cotton farmer would grow
cotton, which should have supported the United States position that the prohibition of certain crops
had "no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production" (the first requirement
of Agreement on Agriculture annex 2), into a point found to undercut the United States position.
Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 29, at 1 376. Noting the Panel's finding that the "over-
whelming majority" of cotton payment recipients continue to produce a permitted crop, the Appel-
late Body concluded that the United States prohibited list caused production of permitted crops to
increase, rather than simply having negative effects on the listed crops. Id. at 1 329. Despite the
theoretical possibility of the Appellate Body's conjecture, the more reasonable conclusion, in light
of the actual evidence of record, is that the prohibited list had no effect on cotton production, as the
United States argued. The conclusion of the Appellate Body in this respect is even more troubling
in view of its later citation to data showing a strong positive correlation between farmers receiving
direct payments and farmers who currently grow cotton. See id. at 9 376 (citing to Cotton Panel
Report, supra note 7, at 7.636, tbls. A-I, A-2).
31. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 1 7.386 (noting a statement by Robert McLen-
den to the House Committee on Agriculture that "I don't think we have a lot of farmers getting
their payments and not working the land" as meaning that producers are constrained in the type of
crops they can plant by the programs at issue).
32. Id. at In 7.386-7.388, WT/DS267/R.
33. Id. at 17.393; see Raj Bhala, supra note 16, at 794-97 (explaining the box system in
general. "Blue box" subsidies are payments tied to output, acreage, or animal numbers that also
require output limits, such as production quotas or land set-asides. For example, paying a rancher
ten dollars for every head of cattle not raised would be a classic blue box subsidy. Like green box
payments, blue box programs are entirely exempt from reduction commitments, although no claim
is made that such subsidies are without trade-distorting effects. Any subsidy that does not fit into
the green or blue boxes automatically becomes an "amber" subsidy, such as price support pay-
ments. Non-de minimis amber box payments are subject to reduction commitments).
34. See Raj Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: The Uruguay Round Agri-
culture Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round," 79 N.D.L.REv. 693, 794-797 (2003);
Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at $ 7.538 (explaining that evidence provided to the Panel by the
20051
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cific commodity in excess of that decided during the 1992 marketing year."35 In
comparing the annual amounts provided from 1999 to 2002 programs that
"clearly and explicitly" specified cotton "as a commodity to which they grant
support36 with the amount "decided during the 1992 marketing year," 37 the Panel
prepared Table 1:
Table 1: Comparison of support in accordance with Article 13(b)(ii)38
(in million dollars)
MY 1992 MY 1999 MY 2000 MY 2001 MY 2002
Marketing loan 866 1761 636 2609 897.8
programme
User marketing 102.7 165.8 260 144.8 72.4
(step 2)
Deficiency 1017.4 0 0 0 0
payments
PFC payments 0 616 574.9 473.5 436
MLA payments 0 613 612 654 0
DP payments 0 0 0 0 181
parties covered only 1999 through 2002, and the Panel used this segment of the 1995 to 2003 "im-
plementation period" to compare with MY 1992).
35. Id. at T 7.433, WT/DS267/R (quoting Agreement on Agriculture art. 13, (b)(ii)).
36. Id. at 7.518. The other programs were the PFC and DP programs previously found
not to qualify for green box treatment, plus user marketing (Step 2) payments, the marketing loan
program, counter cyclical payments, and marketing loan assistance payments. The Panel rejected
United States arguments that the measures to be counted during the implementation period should
include only "product-specific" payments, which would exclude the four programs that provide
planting flexibility because they contain no requirement to produce. The Panel noted that the
United States interpretation would treat several billion dollars in subsidies as not supporting any
commodity at all. Id. at 1 7.519-7.520. The Appellate Body agreed with the United States that
only payments to current producers of cotton should be counted as "product-specific" payments,
which would have been a great victory, but for the fact, indicated supra note 30, that virtually all
farmers with cotton base acres receiving payments also are current producers of cotton.
37. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at n 7.434, 7.452 (finding "curious usage," as
compared with amounts actually granted, to mean particular payments decided upon during
MY 1992, even if distributed at a later time).
38. Id. at % 7.596.
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CCP payments 0 0 0 0 1309
Crop insurance 26.6 169.6 161.7 262.9 194.1
payments
Cottonseed 0 79 184.7 0 50
payments
TOTAL 2012.7 3404.4 2429.3 4144.2 3140.3
The Panel concluded from its calculations that the aggregate non-green
box support during marketing year ("MY") 1992 was exceeded in each of the
implementation period years under review, and that the Peace Clause exempted
none of these programs from the Subsidies Agreement.39 As shown in the table,
the United States exceeded $2 billion in MY 1992 subsidies during MY 1999-
2003 by between $417 million and $2.1 billion. The PFC/DP payments ac-
counted for $473 million to $616 million of the excess. The United States argued
that these programs, which were not in effect during the base year MY 1992,
were exempt green box subsidies. However, the Panel concluded they must be
counted in the reduction commitment because they were not entirely decoupled
from production.' The largest program was marketing loans, which seeks to
minimize potential loan forfeitures by providing interim financing to eligible
producers and whose payments were substantially larger than the base year in all
but MY 2000 and accounted for $32 million to $1.74 billion of the excess in the
three other comparison years.
C. Export Subsidies and Import-Substitution Subsidies
As noted, export subsidies (those conditioned on export of the product)
and import-substitution subsidies (eligibility is met by purchasing a domestic
product rather than an imported one) for agricultural products are prohibited by
the Subsidies Agreement "except as provided in the Agreement on Agricul-
ture." ' Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture prohibits export subsidies that
exceed the reduction commitment specified for a particular product by the par-
ticular Member, as well as any export subsidies for products not listed in the
Member's schedule. The United States has no scheduled commitment for upland
cotton. Therefore, the Agreement on Agriculture prohibits any United States ex-
39. Id. at W 7.597, 7.608.
40. Id. at U 7.416-7.418, 7.553, WT/DS267/R.
41. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 3.1.
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port subsidy provided for cotton." The only United States argument, then, was
that the programs at issue were not export subsidies. The Panel first looked at
user marketing (Step 2) payments, which are special marketing loan provisions
for upland cotton that provides marketing certificates or cash payments to domes-
tic users and exporters of eligible cotton when market conditions result in United
States cotton pricing benchmarks being exceeded.43 In essence, Step 2 payments
are used to compensate United States cotton exporters and millers for their pur-
chase of higher-priced United States cotton.'
In looking at Step 2 payments to cotton exporters, the Panel used the
broader definition of export subsidies in the Subsidies Agreement to find that
such payments indeed were conditioned upon export of the product. The United
States unsuccessfully argued that payments also could be made to domestic users
under the same program and that Step 2 must be examined as a whole as a benefit
to cotton "users," not with respect to any particular payment.45 In the Panel's
view, payments in one set of circumstances may not be ignored just because
payments in other discrete segments of the program are not conditioned on ex-
port.
46
As to Step 2 payments to domestic users of cotton, the Panel determined
this segment of the program constituted an import substitution subsidy, also pro-
hibited under the Subsidies Agreement because "the measure explicitly requires
the use of domestically produced upland cotton as a pre-condition for receipt of
the payments. '47 Because the Agreement on Agriculture's Peace Clause does not
even attempt to protect import substitution subsidies from action under the Sub-
sidies Agreement, Step 2 payments to domestic users are illegal under that
Agreement.48
The Panel next turned to the three export credit guarantee programs,
(GSM 102, GSM 103, and the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program), which aim to
42. See generally Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, at art. 3.3.
43. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at In 7.704, 7.705.
44. See id. at U 7.721-25 (stating cotton purchased for domestic use can trigger receipt
of user marketing payment).
45. Id. at 7.708, 7.723.
46. Id. at 117.700, 7.713, 7.720. The Panel looked to the Appellate Body's decision
during the implementation phase of the case involving United States export taxes (ETI), which
grants a tax exemption in two situations, one conditioned on exportation and one not necessarily so.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"-
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, I 119, WT/DS 108/AB/RW
(Jan. 14, 2002) ("Our conclusion that the ETI measure grants subsidies that are export contingent in
the first set of circumstances is not affected by the fact that the subsidy can also be obtained in the
second set of circumstances.")
47. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 7.1085.
48. Id. at 9f7.1050, 7.1097.
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increase exports of agricultural commodities to compete against foreign agricul-
tural exports by guaranteeing the repayment of credit extended to finance export
sales.49 The first American argument was that negotiators had made clear in Ar-
ticle 10.2 that no present disciplines existed as to export credit guarantees for
agricultural products.5 ° In Article 10.2, "[m]embers undertake to work toward
the development of internationally agreed disciplines to govern the provision of
export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes and, after
agreement on such disciplines, to provide export credits, export credit guarantees
or insurance programmes only in conformity therewith."5
In an unusual dissenting opinion, one Member of the Appellate Body
agreed with the United States argument that Article 10.2 "suggests that it was
believed [by the drafters] that such measures would not be subject to any disci-
plines until such time as disciplines were internationally agreed upon pursuant to
Article 10.2. '' S The majority disagreed, noting Article 10.2 does not expressly
exempt such export subsidies from the disciplines of Article 10.1, which prohib-
its application of subsidies not listed in Article 9 in a manner that circumvents the
Article 9 commitments.53 The majority pointed to other exemptions identified by
the Panel in the Subsidies Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, which the Members had explicitly carved out, pending further multilat-
eral negotiations. 4 No such explicit exemption for export credits had been made
in Article 10.2."
Looking again to the Subsidies Agreement for guidance as to when ex-
port credit guarantees should be considered a prohibited export subsidy, the Panel
noted that the test was whether premiums charged under the export credit guaran-
tee programs were adequate to cover long-term operating costs and losses. 6 The
principal argument was over the treatment of rescheduled debt, but the parties did
not disagree that losses for the programs, for which dairy cattle also are eligible,
were at least $630 million in the past decade, and thus these programs had oper-
ated as prohibited export subsidies during 1999-2002."7
49. Id. at f117.236-7.238.
50. Id. at 17.941.
51. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, at art. 10.2.
52. Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 29, at 638.
53. Id. at 623.
54. Id. at 610.
55. Id. at% 610.
56. See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 7.763 (relying on Item (j) in Annex I to
Subsidies Agreement).
57. Id. at IT 7.846-7.847.
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The Panel thus found that the GSM 102, GSM 103, and Supplier Credit
Guarantee Programs were prohibited export subsidies. 8 Significantly for other
crops, the Panel's finding in this respect is not limited to cotton, despite United
States arguments that Brazil's claim reached only export guarantees for cotton.59
The final subjects of the Panel's analysis were user marketing (Step 2)
payments to domestic users, which the Panel previously had found to be import
substitution subsidies within the meaning of Article 3 of the Subsidies Agree-
ment. Noting that the Agreement on Agriculture's Peace Clause made no men-
tion of import substitution subsidies, the Panel concluded that these types of sub-
sidies were not shielded from the disciplines of the Subsidies Agreement. 6
As export credit guarantees, the GSM 102,103 and the Supplier Credit
Guarantee Programs are prohibited by the Subsidies Agreement.6 The user mar-
keting (Step 2) payment to exporters is also a prohibited export subsidy, and its
payment to domestic users was found to be an import substitution subsidy, also a
prohibited subsidy.62
As to each of these programs found to be prohibited, the Panel, in accor-
dance with Article 4.7 of the Subsidies Agreement, recommended that the pro-
grams be withdrawn "without delay," which specified in these circumstances to
be no later than July 1, 2005.63
D. Serious Prejudice
Having found both export and domestic United States cotton support
programs were not immunized by the Agreement on Agriculture, the Panel
reached Brazil's claim that United States cotton subsidies violate Article 5 of the
Subsidies Agreement, which provides that "[n]o Member should cause, through
the use of any subsidy ... adverse effects to the interests of other Members," i.e.,
"serious prejudice."' Article 6.3(c) defines "serious prejudice" to include cases
when "the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsi-
dized product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in
the same market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in
the same market."65 Brazil alleged that United States subsidies caused serious
prejudice to Brazil's interests during the 1999-2002 marketing years by signifi-
58. Id. at 7.867-7.869.
59. Id. at 7.875.
60. Id. at 7.1050.
61. Id. at$ 7.766.
62. See id. at 7.1120.
63. Id. at 8.3(b).
64. Id. at 7.1155-7.1156.
65. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 6.3(c).
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cantly suppressing upland cotton prices in the Brazilian, world, and American.'
The Panel began its inquiry by finding that Brazilian and United States upland
cotton compete "in the same market," which Article 6.3(c) does not limit geo-
graphically and can mean a world market where, as here, conditions of competi-
tion for sales from both countries are similar.67 This initial finding laid the foun-
dation for the Panel's examination of world cotton prices as the measure of seri-
ous prejudice by satisfying the first of the conditions set by Article 6.3(c):
The subsidized product-U.S. cotton-and a like product6" of another Member-
Brazilian cotton-compete in the same market;
Price suppression exists;
The price suppression is significant; and
The significant price suppression is through the effect of the subsidy.
69
E. Price Suppression
The Panel found three factors relevant to its determination whether price
suppression" had occurred: (a) the relative magnitude of United States produc-
tion and exports in the world upland cotton market; (b) general price trends; and
(c) the nature of the subsidies at issue, in particular whether they have discernible
price suppressive effects.7 As to the first factor, the Panel noted that because the
United States held a substantial proportion of world production (about twenty
percent during MY 1999-2002)72 and export markets (from a twenty-three per-
66. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 7.1108.
67. Id. at 17.1240.
68. See id. at 9H 7.1221-7.1223 (noting that the Panel quickly disposed of squabbles
about whether the competing cotton products were "like," concluding that the "subsidized product"
and the "like product of another Member" was, in both instances, upland cotton lint).
69. Id. at" T7.1278-7.1280.
70. Id. at 7.1277 (noting that price suppression is defined to mean that prices either are
prevented or inhibited from rising, i.e., prices do not increase when otherwise they would have).
71. Id. at 7.1280.
72. See id. at 7.1282 (indicating that the United States accounts for approximately one-
fifth of world production). Although the United States argued that only serious prejudice in 2002,
the last year for which complete data were available, was relevant, the Panel found that given its
examination of subsidies over a period of time, a recent historical period "provides a more robust
basis for a serious prejudice evaluation than merely paying attention to developments in a single
recent year," especially because "the market may well already be distorted in a given year due to
subsidies." Id. at 7.1199.
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cent to forty percent world share during MY 1999-2002) for upland cotton, it
exercised "substantial proportionate influence on prices in the world market.""
Turning to global price trends, the Panel first, in the words of National
Cotton Council CEO Dr. Mark Lange, "dismissed the outlandish economic
model results offered by Brazil's economic expert,"74 which had found that but
for United States cotton subsidies, world cotton prices would have been 12.6
percent (6.5 cents per pound) higher during MY 1999-2002." As Dr. Lange
noted, the Brazilian results had been undermined in recent studies by Texas Tech
and by the Food and Agriculture Organization, both of which found minimal
United States impacts on world prices.76 The Panel observed that Brazil's and
thirteen other studies submitted by the United States and third parties had reached
the common sense conclusion that removal of certain United States subsidies
would lead to a change in world prices and "attributed to them the evidentiary
weight we deemed appropriate."77 Using a chart submitted by the parties at the
Panel's request based on a composite of price sources, the Panel noted a "broad
decline in the overall level of these price trends from 1996 ... [to January] 2002,
with intermittent peaks and valleys" with a clear decline during that period and
an increase after the period."
To determine whether these prices were suppressed, the Panel looked to
subsidies that are price-suppressive by nature.79 The Panel noted that four of the
subsidies were directly linked to world market prices: the marketing loan pro-
gram, Step 2 user marketing payments, marketing loss assistance payments, and
counter-cyclical payments." Under the marketing loan program, which seeks to
minimize loan forfeitures by providing interim financing, the Panel concluded
from its chart of subsidy payments that "[tihe further the adjusted world price
drops, the greater the extent to which United States upland cotton producers'
revenue is insulated from the decline, numbing United States production deci-
sions from world market signals" and thus "enhanc[ing] production and trade-
distorting effects."81 Having earlier concluded that it need not quantify the subsi-
73. See id. at M 7.1281-7.1285.
74. Press Release, Nat'l Cotton Council of Am., NCC Disagrees with BrazillU.S. Dis-
pute Panel's Decision (Sept. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.cotton.org/news/releases/2004/brazil-public.cfm.
75. See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 7.1202, 7.1205.
76. Press Release, Nat'l Cotton Council of Am., supra note 74.
77. See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 19 7.1212, 7.1215.
78. Id. at 9 7.1287-7.1288, chart 1.
79. See id. at 7.1289.
80. Id. at 7.1290.
81. Id. at 7.1294-7.1296, chart 2.
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dies at issue because it was not engaged in a countervailing duty review,82 the
Panel pointed to information in the record that marketing loan subsidies over the
period were in a "very large amount."83
The same descriptor was used for the user marketing (Step 2) program,
whose payments to exporters increased demand for United States cotton and
whose payments to producers raised the price they received and thus stimulated
production.8" In the case of payments to exporters and producers, the amount of
the subsidy is directly linked to world market prices and thus "affects the world
market generally."85 Similar findings were made as to the remaining price-
contingent MLA and counter-cyclical payments.86
In a signal of the importance the Panel continuously accorded to the
price-contingent nature of a subsidy and its relation to world prices, the Panel
found the remaining subsidies - direct payments, crop insurance,87 and produc-
tion flexibility contract payments - while enhancing producer wealth and lower-
ing risk aversion, nonetheless, should not be aggregated with price-contingent
subsidies because they are directed more toward income support and "their price-
suppression effects are not as easily discernible" as the four programs the Panel
decided to aggregate.88 Noting that "neither party ... disputes the proposition that
suppressed world prices may follow from an increased supply being infused on
the world market," that the world cotton price from MY 1998 to MY 2002 fell
about thirty percent from its 1980 to 1998 average, and that United States and
world market prices are closely linked, the Panel found that price suppression
had indeed occurred in the "same" world market within the meaning of Subsidies
Agreement Article 6.3(c).89
F. Significance of the Price Suppression
Recall that Subsidies Agreement Article 6.3(c)'s definition of serious
prejudice is met only if the price suppression is "significant," another undefined
82. Id. at 7.1179.
83. Id. at 17.1297.
84. Id. at 17.1299.
85. Id. at 7.1300.
86. Id. at 17.1301-7.1303. Market loss assistance comprises "ad hoc emergency and
supplementary assistance provided to producers in order to make up for losses sustained as a result
of recent low commodity prices." ld. at 7.216. Counter-cyclical payments provide support to
producers based on historical acreage and yields. Id. at 7.223.
87. Crop insurance protects against losses caused by natural disasters or market fluctua-
tions. Id. at 7.227.
88. Id. at U 7.1305-7.1307.
89. Id. at I 7.1309-7.1312.
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term which the Panel treated in a possibly oversimplified manner as meaning
important, notable, or consequential.90 In an analysis reminiscent of its examina-
tion of whether price suppression existed in the first place, the Panel returned to
the same elements it had considered decisive for that element, which are the rela-
tive magnitudes of United States production and exports, the overall price trends
in the world market, the price-contingent nature of the four programs, and the
readily available evidence of the order of magnitude of the subsidies.9 In effect,
the Panel's single finding of price suppression sufficed as well for its pivotal
conclusion that Brazilian producers faced "significant" suppression of world
prices." Without citing to or likely using any economic data, the Panel opined
that "a relatively small ... suppression of prices could be significant" for a
widely traded commodity such as upland cotton, because profit margins may be
narrow, sales likely are price sensitive, and the market is large.93 Thus the Panel
turned "a relatively small" price effect into significant price suppression. Even
this modest finding is made by reasoning in the negative: "we are certainly not,
by any means, looking at an insignificant or unimportant world price phenome-
non."
94
G. Causal Link Between Subsidies and Price Suppression
Having found several domestic and export subsidies to violate the Subsi-
dies Agreement, as well as significant price suppression in the world market for
cotton, the Panel next examined whether the price suppression was caused by the
subsidies, essentially of course an attribution exercise. While the Panel did not
find in the Subsidies Agreement articles the need to separate effects "to a precise
degree," as would have been required under the Anti-Dumping or Safeguards
Agreements, the Panel nonetheless examined other potential reasons for the sig-
nificant suppression of world cotton prices in finding a causal link based on four
factors.95
As it had in finding price suppression and its significance, the Panel cited
the substantial proportionate influence that the United States exerts in the world
cotton market and the fact that four of the support programs were linked directly
to world market prices. 96 This latter factor was so important to the Panel, as it
had been several times before, that it refused to aggregate the remaining subsi-
90. See id. at 7.1393.
91. See id. at 7.1332.
92. See id. at 7.1394.
93. Id. at% 7.1330.
94. ld. at% 7.1332.
95. Id. at$ 7.1343-7.1344.
96. Id. at 7.1348-7.1349.
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dies that were not price-tied.97 Third, the Panel found a temporal coincidence
between the subsidies and suppressed world prices. Over the same period that
the subsidies were being granted, United States cotton producers generated large
supplies while their revenue-and world market prices-declined. Even taking
account of lower production from the 1998 drought and higher yields from 2001,
the connection between price suppression and the increase in United States ex-
ports is clear.98 Finally, the Panel found that production costs and revenues were
not convergent, indicating that cotton producers would not have been economi-
cally capable of remaining in the market but for the subsidies.99
As to United States arguments that the strong United States dollar has
had an inverse effect on the world price of cotton, which is traded internationally
in United States dollars, the Panel noted that the United States share of the export
market rose dramatically at the same time the dollar appreciated during MY
1999-2001.1°° As to China's release of millions of bales of government stocks at
low prices between 1999 and 2001, the Panel agreed that while this event inevi-
tably would exert downward pressure on world prices, it noted that United States
exports were much larger than China's over this period and that China's action
had no actual effect either on United States production or on its exports, which
were maintained or increased over the period."0 ' The meaning of the Panel's
findings in this section is clearly that the United States effect on the market sim-
ply overshadowed the non-subsidy effects, and causation was thus established. '2
This discussion, however, cannot in any sense constitute an examination
that would ensure that suppression caused by these other factors is not attributed
to United States cotton subsidies, which the Panel seems to concede it must con-
clude, on some level, or else it would have no need at all to look at other poten-
tial causes. Article 6.3(c) requires a finding that "the effect of the subsidy is a..
. significant price suppression... "03 The standard for finding injury in a coun-
tervailing duty examination in Article 15.5 is the same: "[i]t must be demon-
strated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing
injury. ...."," While Article 6.3(c) does not explicitly follow the test articulated
under Article 15.5 that includes a warning that "injuries caused by ... other fac-
97. Id. at [7.1350.
98. Id. at 7.1351.
99. Id. at 7.1353.
100. Id. at 7.1360 (noting that United States cotton producer revenue is effectively
sheltered from currency and price developments).
101. Id. at 17.1361.
102. Id. at 7.1363.
103. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 6, 6.3(c).
104. Id. at art. 15, 15.5.
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tors must not be attributed to the subsidized imports,"'' 5 it is difficult to imagine
any finding of injury under Article 6.3(c) that does not, to some degree, separate
out these other potential causes. The Appellate Body seems to agree,' ° as noted
in the Japanese Hot-Rolled Steel case:
If the injurious effects of the dumped imports are not appropriately sepa-
rated and distinguished from the injurious effects of the other factors, the authori-
ties will be unable to conclude that the injury they ascribe to dumped imports is
actually caused by those imports, rather than by the other factors. Thus, in the
absence of such separation and distinction of the different injurious effects, the
investigating authorities would have no rational basis to conclude that the
dumped imports are indeed causing the injury which, under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, justifies the imposition of anti-dumping duties. °7
The Appellate Body's analysis here relies not on the non-attribution lan-
guage of Article 15.5, but on reason. The Panel in Cotton did not look at the
effect of subsidies by other countries on price suppression.) ° In our view, these
other subsidies clearly also suppress world cotton prices and would continue to
do so even without the United States cotton program. No economic model or
data have yet sorted out the various contributions to this condition of price sup-
pression. The Panel here adds no knowledge to this blank slate.
H. Panel's Use of Economic Data
Brazil's challenge relied heavily on the work of Daniel Sumner, an agri-
cultural economist from the University of California at Davis, who found that, for
the period 1999-2002, United States cotton subsidies caused world prices to drop
roughly by 12.6 percent. 1'I Another study, the so-called Texas model, which
covered only 2003, showed that United States cotton subsidies caused less than a
five percent drop in world prices."0 Part of this difference can be explained by
the high world cotton price in 2003.
Other studies also show that the United States cotton policy causes world
cotton prices to fall. Work by Schmitz, Schmitz, and Dumas shows that, for cer-
105. Id.
106. Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 29, at 438.
107. Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-
Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 223, WT/DS 184/AB/R (July 24, 2001), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/184ABR.doc.
108. See Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 29, at 17.1361.
109. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 7.1202.
110. Suwen Pan, et al., The Impacts of U.S. Cotton Programs on the World Market: An
Analysis of Brazilian WTO Petition, (January 2004),
http://www.utexas.edu/centers/nfic/natlinks/ttustudy.pdf.
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tain time periods prior to 2000, world cotton prices were negatively impacted by
at least ten percent as a result of United States cotton policy. "' The cotton model
developed at the University of Florida, which included water subsidies, found
that for the 2002 period, world cotton prices were impacted by approximately
sixteen percent because of the United States farm program." 2 For 2003, the im-
pact was much less at about four percent."' One important feature of this work is
the debate over the extent to which the United States cotton policy is decoup-
led. " ' The sixteen percent estimate is based on the assumption that United States
producers use the United States cotton target price for production decisions.'
However, many argue that part of the cotton program is decoupled because
United States producers use the loan rate for decision making rather than the tar-
get price." 6 The work at the University of Florida shows that, for the latter,
world cotton prices are negatively impacted by somewhere between five and
thirteen percent for 2002.1"
In summary, all of the economic models of which we are aware show
that United States cotton policy has a negative impact on world cotton prices.
However, the magnitude of the price impact varies among studies for reasons
including the choice of base year, the incorporation of water subsidies, and the
degree to which the United States cotton policy is assumed to be decoupled.
While the above models show the price impact from the United States
cotton policy, we are unaware of any study that analyzes the extent of subsidies
used by importing and exporting competing cotton producers and how these sub-
sidies affect world cotton prices. Even in the absence of the United States cotton
policy, world cotton prices may well be highly distorted in view of the use of
worldwide subsidies either explicit or implicit. As a result, statements made con-
cerning price suppression in the absence of United States cotton policy should be
interpreted with caution because, even without United States cotton policy, cot-
111. Troy G. Schmitz, et al., Gains from Trade, Inefficiency of Government Programs,
and the Net Economic Effects of Trading, 105 J. POLITICAL ECON. 637, 644 (1997).
112. Fred Rossi, et al., The Multiplicative Effect of Water Subsidies and Support Pay-
ments: The Case of US Cotton, I J. INT'L AG. TRADE & DEV. (forthcoming 2005) 55, 62, tbl. 3, 66.
113. Id. at 66, tbl. 8.
114. Id. at 62.
115. See id. at 61 (combining target price and price support in analyzing data).
116. Andrew Schmitz, et al., U.S. Cotton Subsidies under Decoupling (June 9, 2005) 1, 6
(unpublished article on file with journal) (citing B. Gardner, North American Agricultural Policies
and Effects on Western Hemisphere Markets Since 1995, with a Focus on Grains and Oilseeds,
Working Paper WP-02-12; B.K. Goodwin, et al., Explaining Regional Differences in the Capitali-
zation of Policy Benefits into Agricultural Land Values in GOVERNMENT POLICY AND FARMLAND
MARKETS: THE MAINTENANCE OF FARMER WEALTH, 97-114 (C.B. Moss & A. Schmitz, eds. Iowa
State Press 2003)).
117. Id. at 10.
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ton prices may well be below those under free trade due to worldwide cotton
subsidies. In this case, price suppression can exist even in the absence of the
United States cotton policy.
While the empirical results from formal modeling discussed above may
be consistent with the Panel's ruling, the Panel does not use any one specific
economic model on which to hang its results. This may have been due to a num-
ber of factors, including the point raised above, that the formal economic model
cited says very little about price suppression in the absence of United States farm
programs. The Panel appears to rely more heavily on the fact that United States
cotton subsidies were large and the United States was a major player in the world
cotton market. In addition, the Panel relied heavily on other economic data, es-
pecially the United States Department of Agriculture's published cost of produc-
tion data for cotton produced in the United States."8 The data clearly shows that,
in the absence of price supports, United States cotton production could not be
sustained at current levels.' 9
III. DOHA ROUND OUTLOOK
The United States repeatedly has stated that it believes some of the issues
addressed by the Panel would better be handled in the ongoing Doha Round talks
on agriculture. 2 ° Brazil has often voiced disapproval with the notion of address-
ing these issues through negotiations rather than by timely implementation of the
Panel ruling by the United States' Of course, the United States opposes paying
the price demanded by the Panel without extracting some compensation in return,
particularly from Europe.'22 The EU, however, whose views on agriculture are
formidable in the WTO, is unlikely to be supportive of the United States ap-
proach because the EU decided, at least in theory, to decouple from production
over time most Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP") payments. Therefore, the
decision would have minimal impact on the CAP in the longer term.'23 After
their central role in collapse of the September 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference
in Cancun, cotton subsidies have been targeted expressly by WTO Members in
118. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 7.1295.
119. Id. at 7.1362.
120. WTO Issues Landmark Ruling Against U.S. Cotton Subsidies, WTO REPORTER, Sept.
9, 2004.
121. Id.
122. See id. ("U.S. and EU are under pressure from developing countries to agree to
substantial cuts in the hundreds of billions the two powers spend each year on their farm subsidy
programs").
123. See EU Official Sees No Threat to Farm Subsidies from WTO Ruling on Cotton,
WTO REPORTER, June 24, 2004.
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their August 1, 2004, decision to activate anew the Doha Round negotiations. 24
As to agriculture, despite the United States proposal to handle cotton as part of
the overall negotiations, the decision states:
The General Council recognizes the importance of cotton for a certain number of
countries and its vital importance for developing countries, especially LDCs. It will
be addressed ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically within the agriculture ne-
gotiations.
25
The WTO offers elaborate financial penalties to coerce compliance with
Panel rulings, If the losing Member fails within a reasonable period of time to
bring its laws into compliance with the Panel's findings (or those of the Appel-
late Body following an appeal, as in this case), the winning Member may retali-
ate by imposing prohibitive tariffs on imports from the losing country in the
amount of the trade lost as a result of the WTO-inconsistent measure.'26 While
these counter blows do not immediately benefit the industry harmed by the vio-
lating measure (here, Brazil's cotton producers), strong political pressure from
the innocent exporters now suffering from high tariffs often will cause the losing
Member to implement the Panel's recommendations. 27 Brazil's course of action
thus will bring strong pressure on the U. S. Congress to make changes to the last
three years of the latest farm bill, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002. That push will come from industries threatened by Brazil's ability to im-
pose offsetting tariffs on United States exports to compensate for the WTO-
inconsistent cotton subsidies.
The Peace Clause expired at the end of 2003. Additional payments be-
fore termination of the current farm bill in 2007 will be subject to national CVD
124. World Trade Organization, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the Gen-
eral Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L1579 i 1, 1.b, (Aug. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Doha Work Pro-
gramme].
125. Id. at Annex A, 4.
126. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
22, Apr. 15, 2004 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments- Results of the Uruguay Round 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. For
example, since July 1999, the United States and Canada have imposed increased tariffs on a num-
ber of imported products from Europe in the amount of US $116.8 million and CDN $11.3 million
per year following the EC's failure to revise its ban on hormone-fed beef in accordance with the
WTO Appellate Body Report in EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WTO/DS26/AB/R, WTO/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); see Press Release, Directorate Gen. Trade of
the European Comm'n, EU Requests WTO to Confirm That There Is No Justification for
US/Canada to Continue to Apply Sanctions (Nov. 8, 2004),
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/trade/issues/respectrules/dispute/pr081104_en.htm.).
127. See Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the
WTO Improving Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 101, 103 (2005) (noting
pressure to induce compliance of government by parties harmed by trade compensation).
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investigations, as well as WTO dispute settlement system challenges based not
only on which of the amber, blue, or green boxes the Agreement on Agriculture
would place them in, but on whether they meet the definition of a "subsidy."
Payments are also subject to a determination whether they have adverse trade
effects within the meaning of the Subsidies Agreement,12 unless the Agreement
on Agriculture is amended as part of the Doha Round of multilateral negotia-
tions.129 One may speculate whether Congress was aware of this exposure when
it passed the 2002 farm bill, as well as whether the Congressional committees
could have foreseen the Cotton Panel's interpretation of the Peace Clause's outer
boundaries. 3 '
The Panel's decision not to quantify non-exempt subsidies made even
less reviewable and more subjective its conclusion that price suppression existed
in the first place and even more so that it was "significant." By this approach, the
Panel also avoided the need to specify what economic data underlie its conclu-
sions. To a certain degree, all subsidies have market-insulating effects, which
make the question of degree-which the Panel discounts--critical in the serious
prejudice equation. The Appellate Body readily concedes this point by its state-
ment that "[tihe magnitude of the subsidy is an important factor in this analysis
[of price effects],"'' but is unwilling to do more than scold the Panel by saying it
"could have been more explicit and specified what it meant by 'very large
128. John R. Magnus, The Evils of a Long Peace: Legal Consequences of a WTO "Peace
Clause" Expiry and Practical Issues for New Litigation Over Farm Subsidies, 2 (Dec. 4, 2003),
available at http://www.dbtrade.compublications/peace-clause.pdf) (quoting testimony of then
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky as to expiration of the Peace Clause).
129. See Terence P. Stewart, The Ongoing Global Trade Talks Latest Decision - An
Initial Assessment, at 4-5 (Aug. 9, 2004) (unpublished article on file with author) (assessing
changes made to subsidies under the Doha Declaration).
130. The Deputy United States Trade Representative told the Dispute Settlement Body
upon its adoption of the Cotton AB Report that the 2002 United States farm bill was written to be
consistent with the Peace Clause, at least as U.S.T.R. then understood its meaning: "Again, we
wonder whether Members are well served by a Peace Clause interpretation that could not have been
known to any Member designing its support programs ... " Press Release, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations in Geneva, Statements by U.S. Ambassador Linnet Deily at the Meeting of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.us-rrssion.ch/Press2005/0321DSB.htm.
The "front-loaded" United States system for gauging compliance with its international obligations,
which begins and ends with initial amendment of federal laws the Administration and the Congress
believe to be in derogation of the new commitment, but denies the courts any but the most inciden-
tal role in ongoing enforcement, makes particularly difficult implementation of emerging interpre-
tations of those obligations by dispute settlement panels. See John R. Magnus, et al., What Do All
Those Adverse WTO Decisions Mean? 2 (Jan. 30, 2003),
http://www.dbtrade.comlpublications/gulc-tradeupdate.pdf.
131. Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 29, at 1461.
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amounts. 1 3 2 By this "wink and a nod" approach, the Appellate Body signaled
that it was unwilling to disturb the Panel's ultimate finding of significant price
suppression.'33 The authors find in this regal forbearance as to such a striking and
consequential deficiency by the Panel an example of the Appellate Body's occa-
sional foray into the policy sphere, an incursion into the legislative arena that at
times seems irresistible, perhaps unavoidable, for the court of last resort in any
judicial regime. What the Panel and the Appellate Body have overlooked in their
efforts to hasten reduction of farm subsidies is that their failure to devise a quan-
titative standard for serious prejudice leaves WTO Members completely without
guidance on how to bring their agricultural support programs into WTO compli-
ance. The authors agree with the decisions that Cotton is not a countervailing
duty case, which would have required agreement on a precise rate of subsidiza-
tion. In fact, the lack of quantification in effect tells Members to do nothing,
because further dispute settlement litigation will be required before any rule may
emerge that is capable of implementation.
The Panel took several such short cuts, including its finding that any po-
tential reduction in PFC or DP payments through planting of listed crops auto-
matically excludes the entirety of both programs from green box treatment.'3
Actually reviewing the extent of such payment reductions may have revealed that
the likelihood of the planting of listed crops was insignificant; the Panel could
have regarded this as de minimis for purposes of the production-decoupling re-
quirement of the Agreement on Agriculture for direct payments to farmers. One
may also question the Panel's ready conclusion that the simple prohibition of
planting certain crops, for example, to reduce agricultural overproduction-a
goal both the Agreement on Agriculture and Subsidies Agreement would ap-
plaud--disqualifies a direct payment program from the green box on the basis of
this indirect, even incidental, "coupling" with production.
The most striking use of short cuts and likely the element of the Panel's
analysis that will have the most far-reaching effects is the ease with which the
132. Id. at 1468.
133. Id. The Appellate Body lacks the power of national courts to remand the case to the
Panel for correction of errors. It may only reverse, modify, or uphold a panel. DSU, supra note
126, at art. 17.13. Reversing the Panel on this critical step of the analysis would have required
Brazil to begin its complaint anew. For example, Brazil claimed on appeal that the Panel erred in
finding that United States export credit guarantee programs circumvented United States export
subsidy commitments only for rice and not for the twelve other commodities eligible for such cred-
its, including pig and poultry meat. The Appellate Body found that the Panel had not actually
analyzed the twelve other commodities and reversed the Panel's finding as to them. However,
lacking a factual basis to make any findings of its own ("complete the analysis"), the Appellate
Body could give Brazil no further relief, leaving Brazil in the same position as if it had not ap-
pealed this point. Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 29, at 681-683, 689, 693-695.
134. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 9N 7.413, 7.414.
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Panel was able to find price suppression, the key element in its determination that
United States cotton programs caused serious injury to Brazil's cotton growers.
The Panel quickly found that marketing loan payments, counter-cyclical pay-
ments, and Step 2 payments were inherently price-suppressive because the
amount of payments was directly linked to world prices.'35 As the world price
fell, payments increased, with the effect of erasing market signals that ordinarily
would result in decreasing production.'36 Despite some 330 pages devoted to
findings and conclusions, that is the essence of the Panel's analysis. This brevity
most certainly would not have been countenanced by the Appellate Body if it had
been performed by the United States International Trade Commission in deter-
mining injury.137 It is all the more surprising in light of the abundance of relevant
information on the record to which the Panel repeatedly cites, 38 yet refuses to use
to underpin its conclusion. The lack of a quantitative standard was most apparent
in this aspect of its decision. Without explicitly accepting any of the estimates
submitted by the parties, the Panel relied on the relative magnitude of United
States production and exports: "we are certainly not, by any means, looking at an
insignificant or unimportant world price phenomenon."'' 39 United States trade
authorities agree with the observation of the authors that the superficial analysis
of both the Panel and Appellate Body in this respect would never have survived
WTO dispute panel analysis if performed by national authorities.'"
We disagree with the Panel's refusal to develop, and the Appellate
Body's refusal to require, a quantitative standard for determining whether the
effect of such subsidies was "significant." In effect, the Panel collapsed the
game-determining search for the significance of price suppression into the ex-
amination of its very existence, because the Panel used precisely the same factors
to reach both conclusions.14" ' On the other hand, it is more difficult to find fault
with the Panel's conclusion that price-based support programs most directly af-
fect world prices. Income support programs tied to neutral nonprice criteria that
135. Id. at 7.1308.
136. Id. at 7.1294.
137. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, 1[ 162 et seq.,
WT/DS 177/AB/R, WT/DS/178/AB/R (May 1, 2001); Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-
Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 216 et seq.,
WT/DS 184/AB/R (July 24, 2001).
138. E.g. Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 29, at 459; Cotton Panel Report,
supra note 7, at 7.1308.
139. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 17.1332.
140. See Notice of Appeal by United States, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
10, WT/DS267/17 (Oct. 20, 2004); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Formally Backs Cotton Ruling: U.S.
Slams Appellate Body Analysis, WTO REPORTER, ISSN 1529-4153, 1 (Mar. 22, 2005).
141. See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at TT 7.1344 - 7.1362.
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possibly increase production to levels that growers could not have sustained
without the subsidy are unlikely to have such easily discernible effects on
prices.142 Payments that rise or fall with cotton prices undeniably insulate pro-
ducers from market signals, regardless of the merit of the program's bench-
marks. 143
We should also keep in mind that the Subsidies Agreement does not re-
quire, as the Cotton cases vividly demonstrate, proof that subsidies resulted in a
decrease in world prices.'" As noted, price suppression, one of the triggers of a
"serious prejudice" finding along with the more familiar price undercutting or
depression, requires a finding that prices were not rising as fast as they would
have risen absent the subsidies.'45 A panel can find price suppression even if
prices generally are in an upward trend, which is not the familiar situation we
imagine for proof of injury. In addition, by contrast to a finding of price under-
cutting, the standards for making this "but for" determination are greatly more
subjective and dependent on the opinion of the panel members.
We agree with Brazil's statement to the WTO during adoption of the
Cotton cases that the ruling has an "obvious and important impact" on Doha
Round agriculture negotiations.'" Inclusion of the relatively new direct pay-
ments program in the blue, instead of green box, will completely undercut United
States Doha Round plans for the "new" blue box. The United States intended
that the expanded blue box outlined in the July 2004 Framework would contain
its counter-cyclical payments, the program that succeeded the market loss assis-
tance payments the United States had notified to the WTO as amber box subsi-
dies. ' Counter-cyclical payments are directly linked to current prices, but they
142. See Daniel A. Sumner, Farm Programs and Related Policy in the United States, 66-
67, http://www.farmfoundation.org/green/sumner.pdf.
143. See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 17.1308.
144. See Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 29, at 450 (finding because subsi-
dies increased United States production and lowered United States prices, price suppression ex-
isted).
145. Subsidies Agreement art. 6.3(c).
146. Pruzin, supra notel40, at 2-3.
147. See Doha Work Programme, supra note 129 at 13. The first bullet in paragraph 13
refers to the production-limiting programs that are the subject of the current article 6.5 of the
Agreement on Agriculture. The second bullet creates a new blue box for "direct payments that do
not require production if such payments are based on fixed and unchanging bases and yields; or
livestock payments made on a fixed and unchanging number of head; and such payments are made
on eighty-five percent or less of a fixed and unchanging base level of production. Counter-cyclical
payments, under planned reductions, would fit this second bulleted description.
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are decoupled from production.'48 This intended movement of counter-cyclical
payments to the blue box, which is not subject to reduction commitments (al-
though a cap would limit the new blue box), is perhaps the most controversial
proposal in the July 2004 Framework because it would preserve for the United
States a major component of its farm policy. 49 The United States would be re-
quired to make substantial adjustments to stay within its lowered amber box ceil-
ing, but counter-cyclical payments would nonetheless continue. 5' However, the
new blue box for the United States has no room for the $4 billion to $5 billion in
direct payments because it will be filled entirely by an expected $10 billion in
counter-cyclical payments."'
The Cotton case thus substantially changes the starting positions of the
developed country and developing country negotiators by blurring the distinc-
tions between the "boxes" that were clear to the agriculture negotiators during the
Uruguay Round. 52 At a minimum, negotiators will be at pains to avoid by more
precise drafting the technical traps used to advantage by Brazil in the Cotton and
Sugar cases.
IV. APPLICATION TO OTHER CROPS
Not only is cotton highly supported through farm programs, but so are
commodities such as rice and wheat.' 53 These programs are heavily sustained by
government subsidies, minimum price controls, and other market interventions. 54
Japan props up the price of domestic rice through a variety of government subsi-
dies and other market controls.'55
148. Cotton Panel Report, supra note 7, at 7.225-7.226 (explaining that counter-cyclical
payments depend on historical acreage and yields with amount calculated as the difference between
legislation's target price for a commodity and average current price).
149. See Rajesh Aggarwal, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of India to the WTO, Address
on Agriculture at the International Trade Centre Meeting for Selected Asian Countries, "Business
for Development:" Challenges and Options for Government and Business After the Adoption of the
WTO "July Package,"(Oct. 21, 2004), at 4-5 (transcript available at
www.intracen.org/worldtradenet/docs/whatsnew/b4d_2004/india3.pdf).
150. See Telephone Interview with Jim Grueff, former Assistant Deputy Adm'r for Int'l
Trade Policy in the Foreign Agric. Service, U.S. Dep't of Agric., & Principal U.S. Agric. Negotia-
tor (Apr. 15, 2005) (on file with authors).
151. Id.
152. See Bhala, supra note 16, at 780 (explaining the "box" system).
153. Bruce Babcock, Local and Global Perspectives on the New U.S. Farm Policy, 8-3
IOWA AG REVIEW (Summer 2002) 1, 2.
154. Id. at 1.
155. HISAO FUKUDA, ET AL., USDA, RICE SECTOR POLICIES IN JAPAN 4, RCS-0303-01
(Mar. 2003), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/rcs/mar03/rcsO3O3Ol/rcsO3O3-
01 .pdf.
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To put cotton in perspective with other program crops, consider Table 2.
Under the 2002 United States Farm Bill, loan rates and target prices were set for
major United States commodities.'56 Since that time, market prices have been
significantly below target prices. In addition, market prices have at times been
below the loan rate. Both countercyclical and loan deficiency payments have
been sizeable. 57 Cotton is not the only commodity affected. Clearly, U. S. pro-
ducers are selling commodities such as cotton and corn at prices under the full
cost of production. Often the United States is dumping in its export markets. 58
When examining the market prices over time with the data in Table 2, it is clear
why more WTO dispute cases will occur in the future. Cotton is hardly any dif-
ferent from soybeans, corn, or the other commodities listed.
Table 2. Selected United States Agricultural Commodity Loan Rates and
Target Prices, 2002.'59
Crop Loan Rate Target Price
Corn ($/bushel) 1.98 2.60
Sorghum ($/bushel) 1.98 2.54
Wheat ($/bushel) 2.80 3.86
Upland Cotton 0.52 0.72
($/pound)
Rice ($/hundredweight) 6.50 10.50
Barley ($/bushel) 1.88 2.21
Oats ($/bushel) 1.35 1.40
Soybeans ($/bushel) 5.00 5.80
Minor Oilseeds 0.096 0.10
($/pound)
Any support program for a crop that limits planting of alternative crops,
such as the PFC and DP payments, is vulnerable to challenge under the Panel's
reasoning that such a limitation constitutes a tie to production. DP payments are
available under the same restrictions for rice, soybeans, wheat, corn, and other
crops, which makes payments to producers of these commodities vulnerable.160
156. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7914, 7932 (2005).
157. See Bruce A. Babcock & Chad E. Hart, Judging the Performance of the 2002 Farm
Bill, 11-2 IOWA AG REVIEW (Spring 2005) 1-3 (examining current market income and targets)
158. See Babcock, supra note 153, at 2.
159. See id.; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 7914, 7932 (2005).
160. Because the Appellate Body and Panel found that DP payments are not price-
dependent and thus should not be considered in the price suppression analysis, the vulnerability of
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More importantly to specialty agriculture, if DP or similar green box support
programs cannot lawfully discourage planting of alternative crops (because, for
example, domestic demand is being met by existing production), downward price
pressure will be increasingly exerted on fruit and vegetable, tree nut, melon, and
wild rice production.
The United States will be under strong pressure to repeal its agricultural
export credit guarantee programs long before Doha Round negotiations would
require this result and has already offered both regulatory and legislative
amendments to accomplish this result. 6 ' This pressure also will have direct ef-
fect on the many other crops eligible for such guarantees, including the hog and
poultry meats that were of such concern to Brazil. Rice, corn, oilseeds, wheat,
and soybeans also receive substantial export credit subsidies.'62
The United States was unsuccessful in convincing the Appellate Body
that conditioning the amount of a payment on the production undertaken by the
producer, which is not the case under DP, is different from banning a DP recipi-
ent from producing certain crops, which is what DP does. The Appellate Body
concluded that:
"[diecoupling of payments from production under paragraph 6(b) can only be en-
sured if the payments are not related to... either a positive requirement to produce
certain crops or a negative requirement not to produce certain crops or a combina-
tion of both positive and negative requirements on production of crops."'
163
Rumors abound of another case being considered by Brazilian growers,
based on the reasoning of the Cotton case, against the United States soybean in-
dustry, which is expected to receive $3.25 billion in subsidies if President Bush's
2006 budget is adopted - an amount that rivals receipts by upland cotton pro-
ducers from 1999 to 20 0 3 ." Much of this possible increase would consist of
direct payments and crop insurance subsidies, which are not tied to prices and
thus not considered by the Cotton panel's reasoning to contribute to serious
DP payments for other crops would seem to be limited to the inclusion of the DP program in the
United States non-green box reduction commitments. See supra text accompanying note 36.
161. Derrick Caine, USDA Releases Administration Proposal to Comply with WTO Deci-
sion on Cotton, 22 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1099 (2005); Gary G. Yerkey, USDA Announces Steps
to Bring U.S. Into Compliance with WTO Cotton Ruling, 22 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1099 (2005).
162. Final Cotton Decision Could Have Major Impact on U.S. Farm Policies, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, June 25, 2004, at 1, 19.
163. Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 29, at 325.
164. Daniel Pruzin, American Soy Group Downplays Prospects of Brazil WTO Complaint
on U.S. Subsidies, WTO REP., ISSN 1529-4153 (Feb. 22, 2005); Daniel Pruzin & Gary Yerkey,
WTO Appellate Body Upholds Ruling Against U.S. Subsidy Programs for Cotton, WTO REP., ISSN
1529-4153 (Mar. 4, 2005).
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prejudice.'65 Marketing loans, counter-cyclical payments, and loan deficiency
payments may be substantially greater than past years unless recent favorable
pricing trends continue.'66 Dairy and rice are often mentioned by Brazilian offi-
cials as subsidized United States programs especially vulnerable as a result of the
Appellate Body's upholding all the findings of the Cotton Panel Report.67
V. EC-SUGAR SUBSIDIES
A. Relevant Provisions of EC Sugar Regime and the Agreement on Agriculture
The EC sugar regime establishes production quotas for two categories of
sugar, labeled "A sugar" and "B sugar."' 68 These production quotas, which are
divided among the EC's many sugar producers based on prior production levels
after the quotas are allocated to individual Member States, are the maximum
amounts of sugar that may be sold within the EC in a given year.16 9 Producers
must export any surplus amounts, designated "C sugar."'17 If a producer cannot
establish that it exported any amount produced above its "A sugar" and "B
sugar" quotas, the producer will be charged penalties. 7 ' The production quotas
also establish the maximum quantities of sugar that may receive domestic price
supports. Domestic prices for A and B sugar are supported by a combination of
minimum prices, supply management, import restrictions, and by requiring
Member State agencies to intervene in the market to purchase A and B sugar at
prices that ensure a "fair income" for sugar-beet and sugar-cane producers.'72
The EC also provides direct export subsidies (called "refunds" by EC
law) for A and B sugar.'73 The amount of the export refund is the amount by
which the EC internal market price exceeds the world market price.'74 Even
165. Pruzin, supra note 164.
166. Id.
167. Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 164.
168. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 3.4.
169. Id. at 3.4, 3.6.
170. Id. at J 3.4.
171. Id. In the alternative, producers may carry C sugar over to the following marketing
year in an amount up to twenty percent of the producer's A sugar quota. Andrew Schmitz, The
European Union's High-Priced Sugar-Support Regime, in SUGAR AND RELATED SWEETENER
MARKETS 193, 205 (Andrew Schmitz et al. eds., CABI Publ'g. 2002).
172. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 3.7.
173. Id. at 3.4.
174. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001 (Jun. 19, 2001) carries forward the 1968
Common Organization for Sugar. Id. at 3.1. The Panel noted that a significant complication in
appraising the WTO compliance of the sugar regime was that producers of A, B, and C sugar are
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though C sugar must be exported, C sugar does not receive direct export subsi-
dies.' EC sugar producers may purchase sugar beets below the minimum price
set for A and B sugar beets if they use the beets for C sugar production.7 6 The
prices for C sugar beets generally are about sixty percent of the prices for A and
B sugar beets. 77
The EC has entered into trade agreements, among others, with former
colonies of EC Member States in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (the
ACP/EC Partnership Agreement).' This ACP/EC Partnership Agreement
("Agreement") obligates the EC to import about 1.29 million metric tonnes of
sugar from these countries. 7 9 The EC also has signed a preferential agreement
that requires importation of an additional 10,000 tonnes from India. 8° The
minimum price system applies to these imports. In addition, the EC grants EC
sugar producers export refunds, at the same level as those for A and B quota
sugar, on export amounts equivalent to the imports of ACP/India origin sugar.'8 '
Article 9.2 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture requires an approxi-
mate one-third reduction of existing export subsidies on agricultural commodi-
ties.'82 Each WTO Member providing such subsidies has set out its reduction
commitments on a product-by-product basis in a schedule of commitments.'83
These schedules became binding provisions by their incorporation by reference
in the Agreement. Articles 3 and 8 prohibit Members from providing export sub-
sidies except as permitted both by the Agreement and the particular Member's
commitment schedule.I Article 3.3 establishes a two-part test by its requirement
that "a Member shall not provide export subsidies ... in excess of the budgetary
outlay and quantity commitment levels," which it has set with respect to agricul-
tural products in a certain part of its schedule.'85
the same enterprises and these products are produced on the same production lines. The categories
are created by the legal regime and do not necessarily reflect physical differences in the sugar.
175. Id. at 13.4.
176. Id. at 913.8.
177. Id.; BAREND HAZELEGER, EU SUGAR POLICY: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT IMPACT AND
FUTURE REFORM 29 (Agrapen 2001).
178. See ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, 2000 O.J. (L317) 267, arts. 1, 3(1), 3(3),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/1_3171_31720001215en00030286.pdf.
179. See id. at art. 4(1) (stating quantities of cane sugar Community will purchase).
180. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 1 3.14.
181. Id. at 7.234.
182. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 4, at art. 9.2.
183. See id. at art. 3 (stating Member cannot subsidize domestic producers in excess of
commitment levels).
184. Id. at arts. 3, 8.
185. Id. at art. 3.3.
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Article 3.3 also provides that the types of export subsidies subject to re-
duction commitments are those detailed in Article 9.1.186 Of relevance here, the
subsidies subject to reduction commitments include direct subsidies to producers
"contingent on export performance" and "payments on the export of an agricul-
tural product that are financed by virtue of government action."' 7
In the relevant section of its reduction commitment schedule, the EC lim-
its its export subsidies on sugar to 1,273,500 tonnes and 499.1 million euros.'88
The commitment states: "does not include exports of sugar of ACP and Indian
origin on which the Community is not making any reduction commitments. The
average of export in the period 1986 to 1990 amount to 1.6 mio t."' 8 9 Brazil,
Thailand, and Australia alleged that the EC had exceeded its reduction commit-
ments in each year since 1995, including in the 2001-2002 marketing year by
exporting upwards of four million tonnes of subsidized C sugar."9
B. Determination of EC Export Subsidy Reduction Commitment Levels
Before reaching the issues of whether the EC had exceeded its volume
and budgetary commitment as to sugar, the Panel first had to decide precisely
what was the EC's export subsidy commitment for sugar. The EC argued that its
volume limitation for sugar exports was not solely the 1.273 million tonnes listed
in the main part of its schedule, but in addition to the 1.6 million tonnes identi-
fied in Footnote 1, which the EC said was intended to expand its commitment. 9 '
The Panel rejected the EC's claim on two grounds. The Panel first noted
that the very words used do not, giving the terms their ordinary meaning, accom-
plish what the EC says they do, namely, "makes it clear that exports [equivalent
to] the quantity of ACP/India sugar imported shall not be counted against the
commitments made on the base period levels."'92 The Footnote literally attempts
186. Id.
187. Id. at annex 1, art. 9.1 (a), (c).
188. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 3.13.
189. Id.; see Council Decision 2005 O.J. (L 209) 31 (defining ACP as eighteen African,
Caribbean, and Pacific states); European Commission Directorate - General for Agriculture, Re-
form of the Common Agricultural Policy: Medium - Term Prospects for Agricultural Markets and
Income in the European Union 5 (2003),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/publi/caprep/prospects2OO3b/summary.pdf (listing "mio" as
the abbreviation for "million" and "t" as the abbreviation for "Metric tonne").
190. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 169, at 7.1.
191. Id. at I 7.166, 7.168.
192. Id. at 1 7.168 (emphasis added). The EC noted that it was well-known to all parties
at the time the Agreement on Agriculture was concluded that the EC did not grant export refunds
on the re-export of sugar of ACP/Indian origin, but rather to an exported quantity of A or B sugar
equivalent to such imports. Id. at 1 7.117.
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to exempt sugar of ACP/India origin from the EC's export subsidy commitments,
which makes little sense. The Panel essentially found that the EC's reading of
the sentence, did not comport with the words it used.'93 More importantly, the
Panel found that Footnote 1 has no legal value because it does not meet the re-
quirements of Article 3.3, which prohibits export subsidies in excess of the budg-
etary and quantity commitments specified in a Member's schedule. Footnote 1
does not even attempt to specify a budgetary commitment as to ACP/India sugar.
Without this aspect of the commitment, a complainant could never prove a viola-
tion of Article 3.3, and the EC thus cannot point to Footnote 1 as part of its speci-
fied commitment.'94
C. Whether the EC Subsidized Its Non-Quota Sugar Exports
The importance of listing in a Member's schedule both the quantity lim-
its and the budgetary outlay become clear in light of the analysis by the Appellate
Body in the 2001 Canada-Dairy case of the elements of proof of a violation of
Article 3.3.95 The first element is that the challenged Member has exported an
agricultural product in excess of its quantity commitment level.'96 However,
simply proving exportation of the product in excessive quantities does not estab-
lish a violation; the Member must have granted export subsidies with respect to
these excessive quantities.'97
To make export subsidies more difficult to grant, even if specified in a
Member's schedule, drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture added a procedural
193. Id. at 7.169, 7.180.
194. Id. at 7.137-7.138. The Panel also took account of the inconsistency of the EC's
statements to the Committee on Agriculture and the Panel and the inconsistency between the in-
formation contained in its notifications and its assertions before the Panel. The Panel concluded
that the Footnote has never been treated by the members of the Committee on Agriculture, nor by
the EC, as a commitment specified in the EC Schedule. Although the Panel treated this 1.6 million
tonnes of exported sugar separately from C sugar in the remainder of its report, the Panel continu-
ally referred to this amount as "what the European Communities considers to be ACP/India equiva-
lent sugar." Id. at 7.237.
195. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the
United States, WT/DSI 13/AB/RW, WT/DS 103/AB/RW (Dec. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate
Body Milk Report].
196. Id. atT2.
197. See id. at 71-73, WT/DS 103/AB/RW. As the Appellate Body stated in its review
of the Sugar Panel Report, "[a] commitment on budgetary outlay alone provides little predictability
on export quantities, while a commitment on quantity alone could lead to subsidized exports taking
place that would otherwise have not taken place but for the budgetary support." Appellate Body
Report, European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar, 197, WT/DS265/AB/R,
WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body Sugar Report].
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rule that simplifies proof of a violation of Article 3.3219g This rule reverses the
burden of proof to establish, in the first instance, the elements of the violation.
Normally, in this case, complainants Brazil, Thailand, and Australia would have
the burden of both coming forward with the evidence of the EC exceeding its
quantity limits on sugar exports and of the EC subsidizing these excessive ex-
ports of sugar. Article 10.3 of the Agreement reverses that burden as to the sec-
ond element. The complaining Member must prove only the first element of the
violation, that the EC exceeded its sugar export quota in a given year. Article
10.3 then shifts the burden to the EC to prove that it did not grant an export sub-
sidy on the excess exports.'99 Complainants had no difficulty in establishing the
first element of an Article 3.3 violation. Having lost its argument concerning the
quantity level of its sugar commitment, the EC found Article 10.3 impossible to
overcome.
200
The EC itself had reported to the WTO sugar exports of 4.097 million
tonnes in the 2000/2001 marketing year, which was 2.82 million tonnes in excess
of the EC's commitment level.20'
1. ACP/India Equivalent Sugar
The EC admitted that exports by EC producers of sugar equivalent in
amount to the quantity of imports of ACP/India sugar received the same level of
export refunds as did A and B quota sugar that were exported.2 2 The Panel
quickly found that these export subsidies were subject to reduction commitments
under Article 9.1 (a) of the Agreement on Agriculture as "the provision by gov-
ernments or their agencies of direct subsidies ... to producers of an agricultural
product.., contingent on export performance." Refunds were made only on
exports, the payments were made by the government, and were paid directly to
EC sugar producers.2"3
198. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, at art. 10.3.
199. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 169, at 17.34.
200. See id. at 7.293.
201. Id. at 1 7.230. Note that the EC exceeded even the expanded commitment level it
had urged on the Panel by almost a million and a quarter tonnes. Proving the expanded level would
have value to the EC nonetheless, because the level of retaliation would thereby have been reduced
under Article 22.4 of the WTO Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes: "The level of the
suspension of concessions... shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment." DSU
art. 22.4.
202. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 7.234.
203. See id. at IN 7.235-7.238.
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2. C Sugar
The question of subsidization of C sugar is not so clear. Recall that C
sugar is not eligible for direct export refunds. C sugar also may not be sold on
the EC domestic market with that market's minimum price supports. Complain-
ants alleged that C sugar, nonetheless, is cross subsidized by the domestic and
export subsidies for A and B quota sugar, as well as by the ability of sugar pro-
ducers to purchase C sugar beets below the cost of their production because these
"4payments" constitute a transfer of financial resources to the same producers that
make and export C sugar. 4 Complainants argue that both of these types of pay-
ments are export subsidies because producers must export C sugar."5 As noted
below, the Panel agreed with both arguments.
a) Below-cost sales of C sugar beets
Article 9.1 (c) of the Agreement on Agriculture, the provision complain-
ants alleged the EC violated by its indirect subsidies on C sugar, requires reduc-
tion commitments for "payments on the export of an agricultural product that are
financed by virtue of government action." The Panel first decided that the ability
of sugar producers to purchase C sugar beets below their cost of production was a
payment in kind to producers within the meaning of Article 9.1 (c) because pro-
ducers were receiving an input to C sugar below its "proper value."2" The Panel
determined that the "proper value" is the beet's total average cost of production
because the beet producer is transferring economic resources to the sugar pro-
ducer/exporter if the sale is below total cost.2"7 Thus, a "payment" has been made
within the meaning of Article 9.1 (c). 0 8
Was the payment made "on the export of an agricultural product?"
Complainants alleged that C beets may be used only to produce C sugar, which
in turn must be exported.2" This linkage was enough to convince the Panel that
payments by way of below-cost C beets were made "on the export," which the
Panel interpreted to mean "in connection with the export" of C sugar.210 The
Panel then turned to the third part of the Article 9.1 (c) test, which addresses
whether the payment in kind through below-cost sales of C sugar beets to C sugar
204. Id. at 7.295.
205. See id. at 7.318.
206. Id. at 7.269.
207. Id. at 1 7.263-7.268.
208. Id. at 7.270.
209. Id. at 17.277.
210. Id. at 1 7.277-7.279.
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producers on the export of C sugar was a payment "financed by virtue of gov-
ernmental action."
Although the Panel did not say as much, it appears that the EC foundered
on the reverse burden of proof as to this part of the Article 9.1 (c) test. The Ap-
pellate Body in Canada-Dairy had found that Article 9.1 (c) requires a "demon-
strable link" and a "clear nexus" between the payment and the "government ac-
tion. ' " ' The Panel found close EC involvement in the sale of C sugar beets from
the EC' s control of the price of A and B sugar beets, the prescription of a frame-
work for beet and sugar producers to negotiate the price of C sugar beets, and the
dependence of the price of C sugar beets on the export price of C sugar."' The
EC countered that the Council Regulation does not regulate the price of C sugar
beets and that beet farmers grow other crops, any one of which could be cross-
subsidizing the beet farmer's ability to sell its C sugar beets below their total
production cost. The EC's involvement in the sale of C sugar beets did not meet
the "causal link" test.213
The Panel was unconvinced. The EC, it said,
controls virtually every aspect of domestic beet and sugar supply and management.
In particular, the EC Regulation fixes the price of A and B beet that renders it highly
remunerative to farmers/growers of C beet. Government action also controls the
supply of A and B beet (and sugar) through quotas. ... In sum, the European Com-
munities controls both the supply and the price of sugar in the internal market. This
controlling governmental action is "indispensable" to the transfer of resources from
consumers and tax payers to sugar producers for A and B quota sugar and, through
them, to growers for A and B quota beet.
214
The Panel seemed to be especially influenced by the fact that large num-
bers of EC farmers continue over the years to engage in the production of C
sugar beets. As the Appellate Body noted in upholding the Panel's reasoning,
"the continued production of such large volumes of over-quota beet, at prices
well below its cost of production, could not take place but for governmental ac-
tion." 5 Article 10.3 was important in this regard, in our view, because the Panel
too easily discounted the EC's explanation of cross-subsidization from other
crops as inadequate to overcome the presumption of illegal subsidization.26
211. Id. at I7.281.
212. Id. at 7.283-7.284.
213. Id. at 7.285.
214. Id. at% 7.291.
215. Appellate Body Sugar Report, supra note 197, at 248.
216. See Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 7.286.
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b) Cross-subsidies from domestic supports for A and B sugar
The Panel went on to consider the final element of the complainants' ar-
gument, which was whether the high domestic prices for A and B sugar served as
cross subsidies on the export of C sugar, allowing EC sugar producers to sell C
sugar below fixed costs. Despite the absence of direct export subsidies for C
sugar, producers are able to recover a portion of their fixed costs on export by
spill over of revenues from sales of A and B sugar. 17 The Panel on this claim put
most of its determinations with respect to below-cost purchases of C sugar beets
to further use. First, the Panel determined that the cross-subsidization constituted
a "payment" within the meaning of Article 9. 1(c):
[T]he relatively high EC administered domestic market (above-intervention) prices
for A and B quota sugar allow the sugar producers to recover fixed costs and to sell
exported C sugar over average variable costs but below the average total cost of
production. Sugar is sugar whether or not produced under an EC created designa-
tion of A, B or C sugar. A, B or C sugar are part of the same line of production and
thus to the extent that the fixed costs of A, B or C are largely paid for by the profits
made on sales of A and B sugar, the EC sugar regime provides the advantage which
allows EC sugar producers to produce and export C sugar at below total cost of pro-
duction. For the Panel this cross-subsidization constitutes a payment in the form of
a transfer of financial resources.
21 8
Before the Appellate Body, the EC argued that "the 'payments' identi-
fied by the Panel are not 'payments' within the meaning of Article 9. 1(c), be-
cause they constitute only an 'internal allocation' of the sugar producer's re-
sources and do not provide the sugar producer with new additional resources. ' '219
The EC contended any "payment" resulting from the transfer of financial re-
sources by sugar beet farmers was merely a "notational" one by sugar producers
in their account books.2" The Appellate Body, agreeing with the Panel, was un-
convinced: "In the light of the enormous difference between the price of C sugar
and its average total cost of production [the Panel had found that the price did not
'even remotely' cover costs221], we do not see how the 'payment' identified by
the Panel was 'purely notional'. ' ' 2
The Panel emphasized, as it had with respect to the purchase of the C
sugar beet inputs, that C sugar must be exported: "Because of that legal require-
217. Id. at$ 7.288.
218. Id. at $ 7.310.
219. Appellate Body Sugar Report, supra note 197, at 261.
220. See id. at 264.
221. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at $ 7.301.
222. Appellate Body Sugar Report, supra note 197, at 1 264.
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ment, advantages, payments or subsidies to C sugar, that must be exported, are
subsidies 'on the export' of that product. 2 23
Regarding the final element of the Article 9. 1(c) test, that is, whether the
sugar is "financed by virtue of governmental action," the Panel again referred to
the broad EC governmental action of regulating the domestic sugar market:
The higher revenue sales for quota sugar in the internal market effectively finances
some or all of the fixed costs of C sugar. C sugar is cross-subsidized through direct
subsidies, price support mechanisms and related mechanisms for quota sugar, all of
which are regulatory instruments of the EC sugar regime.
2 24
D. Relevance of CVD Attribution Rules
The concept of cross subsidization is well known to purveyors of na-
tional countervailing duty (CVD) laws that offset, through border taxes, the com-
petitive advantages of imports benefiting from government subsidies. In the
technical jargon of CVD cases, the question for a recurring subsidy such as the
EC's sugar support regime is whether a government subsidy should be "attrib-
uted" to a particular product or whether the benefit of the subsidy should be
spread over all production of a company. 5 Subsidies that are "tied" to a particu-
lar product or to a particular market will be attributed only to that product or that
market.226 Otherwise, the general rule is that, "[t]he Secretary will attribute a
domestic subsidy to all products sold by a firm, including products that are ex-
ported." '227 The Panel did not employ the expertise gained by national authorities
in CVD cases. It instead relied on an interpretation of the literal language of Ar-
ticle 9.1 (c) of the Agreement on Agriculture and a common sense explanation of
the realities of farming as a business.22s
We may ask how national CVD authorities, at least those in the United
States, would have attributed these subsidies. The EC system is specific about
223. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 17.321.
224. Id. at 7.326. Dr. Schmitz has elsewhere written that EC exports are "cross subsi-
dized in the European Union by ... excess profits earned on the A-quota and B-quota production of
sugar." Andrew Schmitz, supra note 172, at 196.
225. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.525(a) (2005).
226. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.525(b)(4) (2005).
227. 19 C.F.R. § 351.525(b)(3) (2005).
228. The Panel also chose as a matter of judicial economy not to reach claims that the EC
sugar regime also violated the Subsidies Agreement, finding the claims undeveloped and not ready
for examination "Complainants' have not set forth their claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agree-
ment in quite as clear and unambiguous a manner as under the Agreement on Agriculture.... The
Panel considers that the important questions presented under the SCM Agreement in this dispute
would be best decided in a case where they have been further argued by the parties." Sugar Panel
Report, supra note 8, at 7.386-7.387.
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the product beneficiaries of each of its subsidies. Export refunds are available for
A sugar, B sugar, and for an amount of exported sugar equivalent to ACP/India
imports. C sugar is explicitly not eligible for such export refunds. The EC sets
minimum prices for A and B sugar, as well as for imported ACP/India sugar. No
price support is provided for C sugar because it may not legally be sold within
the Community (except as a carry-forward to the next year's A and B sugar quo-
tas).229
"Tying" rules are arcane, especially in light of the need to guard against
potential circumvention of the CVD law by knowledgeable subsidizing govern-
ments. Tying rules attempt to make practical sense of the basic theoretical eco-
nomic proposition that money is fungible and that a dollar given by the govern-
ment for the ostensible purpose of paying a firm's dairy plant electricity bill
means that a dollar is freed to spend on painting the firm's horse barn.23° Some
tying rules are essential to calculate a per-unit rate of subsidization in a CVD
investigation. Perhaps the rough justice meted out by the Sugar Panel was tech-
nically acceptable in a WTO case for which quantification is unnecessary. How-
ever, addressing the intricacies of tying and fungibility brings with it useful les-
sons that could have made the Panel's analysis tighter and more credible. The
Panel's treatment of the entire EC sugar regime as untied subsidies would bear
close scrutiny if the issue arose in a CVD investigation.23" '
E. Application to Tariffs and Other Import Restrictions
The EC's final lament to the Panel was that the Panel's attribution of the
benefit from any governmental intervention in the commodity marketplace to be
"by virtue of government action" under Article 9 of the Agreement on Agricul-
ture would extend that Agreement's strict export subsidy rules far beyond the
types of government programs intended by the drafters.232 Under this reasoning,
a government's high tariff, or its limitation of imports because of a safeguard
action to protect against the effects of temporary surges in imports, or even its
exchange rate policy, could have the incidental effect of "financing" export sales
at a loss.
In essence, the EC believes, the Panel has held that when a company ex-
ports an agricultural product below its total cost of production-a common prac-
tice for agricultural exports-a panel may find export subsidization by virtue of
229. Id. at 13.4.
230. Interview with John Magnus, President, Tradewins, LLC (on file with authors)
(commenting that fungibility tells us what is possible, while tying tells us what is likely).
231. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S., 162 F. Supp. 2d 639 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001).
232. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 1 7.311.
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"government action" under Article 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture if the gov-
ernment provides a high degree of support for the commodity.233
One aspect of the Panel's response would seem to be incorrect on its
face. The Panel cites to the Appellate Body's statement in Canada-Dairy to the
effect that Article 9 reaches a broad range of government activities as potentially
supporting a claim that the benefits from customs duties, for example, could be
considered payments on the export of an agricultural product by virtue of gov-
ernment intervention.2" The authors are confident the Appellate Body had in
mind no such sweeping inclusion of government measures that do not sound in
subsidization.235 If indeed that result was the Appellate Body's meaning, then
every WTO Member's agricultural programs are subject to challenge for their
tariffs, safeguard restrictions, even their food safety rules, none of which previ-
ously has been considered fodder for the support provisions of the Agreement on
Agriculture or for the subsidy disciplines of the Subsidies Agreement.
On the other hand, the Panel is applying a straightforward causation
standard to find the below-cost sale of C sugar beets by sugar beet farmers to be
"by virtue of government action." The combination of government interventions
in the sugar beet market led directly to that result, even though the EC issued no
directives or even encouragement to beet farmers to transfer economic resources
to EC sugar producers." 6 By comparison, some trade experts believed the Subsi-
dies Agreement had set up a similar causation standard for transfers of economic
resources by private actors. 7 The Subsidies Agreement provides that the gov-
ernment will be considered to have made a "financial contribution" (a required
element of a subsidy) if the government "entrusts or directs" a private body to
transfer funds.238 However, two Panels recently have effectively read this indirect
means of subsidization out of the Subsidies Agreement by finding that the lan-
guage requires "affirmative acts of delegation or command." '239 The EC's sub-
233. Appellate Body Sugar Report, supra note 197, at 1283.
234. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 17.313.
235. The Appellate Body did not find occasion to clarify this portion of the Panel's deci-
sion. See Appellate Body Sugar Report, supra note 197, at 259.
236. See Appellate Body Milk Report, supra note 195.
237. See id. at 1 95, WT/DS 103/AB/RW2, WT/DS 113/AB/RW2.
238. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 1.1 (a)(l)(iv).
239. Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, 1 7.406,
WT/DS273/R (Mar. 7, 2005); Panel Report, United States-Countervailing Duty Investigations on
Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAMS)from Korea, 17.77, WT/DS296/R (Feb. 21, 2005).
The Appellate Body's reversal of the DRAMS Panel on the narrow grounds that "the Panel failed
to consider that pieces of evidence, especially circumstantial evidence, might become more signifi-
cant when viewed in their totality" does not undercut this conclusion. Appellate Body Report,
United States-Countervailing Duty Investigations on Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAMS)
from Korea, 1 158, WT/DS296/AB/R (Jun. 27, 2005).
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stantial involvement in sugar beet production would not likely have met the Sub-
sidies Agreement test.
F. Determination of Export Subsidy Under Article 9
As noted, under attribution rules for CVD investigations, authorities
could have concluded that the high prices set for sale within the Communities of
limited quantities of A and B sugar should be attributed to sales of A, B, and C
sugar. They might also have reached the opposite result, depending on whether
authorities viewed the domestic benefits to be "tied" solely to A and B sugar.
What attribution rules will not do, however, is convert domestic subsidies into
export subsidies. That is, untied domestic subsidies may be attributed to export
sales, but they remain domestic subsidies for purposes of the other provisions of
the Subsidies Agreement.' 4 To find the EC in violation of Article 3.3 of the
Agreement on Agriculture, the Panel was required to find that the subsidies on C
sugar and on the 1.6 million tonnes of sugar exported under the rubric of
ACP/Indian sugar were export subsides under Article 9 of the Agreement on Ag-
riculture.
Article 1 (e) of the Agreement on Agriculture defines "export subsidies"
to mean "subsidies contingent upon export performance, including the export
subsidies listed in Article 9 of this Agreement."241 This tighter test, identical to
that under Article 3 of the Subsidies Agreement, is repeated in Article 9. 1(a),
which identifies "direct subsidies, including payments-in-kind," as one of the
export subsidies subject to reduction commitments.242 As stated by the Depart-
ment of Commerce Regulations, "the Secretary will consider a subsidy to be con-
tingent upon export performance if the provision of the subsidy is, in law or in
fact, tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings, alone or as one
of two or more conditions."243 The fact that a company receiving a government
benefit happens to export some or even all of its production in a given year will
not convert that benefit into an export subsidy if the benefit is not explicitly tied
to export performance as a condition of its issuance.
The Panel applied the Article 9.1 (a) test to exports of what the EC con-
sidered to be equivalent to ACP/India origin imports, that is, 1.6 million tonnes
240. For example, Article 3 of the Subsidies Agreement declares that subsidies contin-
gent on export performance are prohibited, and other articles provide a fast track to elimination of
those kinds of subsidies, which are considered especially trade distorting. See Subsidies Agree-
ment, Annex IA, supra note 11, at art. 3.1-3.2.
241. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, at art. 1 (e).
242. Id. at art. 9.1 (a).
243. 19 C.F.R. § 351.514(a) (2005).
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of sugar exports.2' These export refunds were indeed "direct subsidies" and eli-
gibility was based solely on whether the sugar was exported, thus clearly meeting
the contingency test of Article 9.1 (a).2 45
Article 9.1 (c), on the other hand, does not contain a contingency test, at
least not in those words. The paragraph labels as an export subsidy "payments
on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of governmen-
tal action.""24 The Panel explicitly decided not to apply to this paragraph the
tighter "contingency" test of Articles 1 (e) and 9.1 (a) of the Agreement on Agri-
culture, that is, that the subsidy must be "contingent" upon export performance. 47
The Panel stated that the EC's argument that Article 9.1 (c) requires a contin-
gency test "misinterprets" the Agreement on Agriculture.248 While the EC price
support program "as a whole is de facto contingent upon C sugar being exported"
(apparently thus meeting the contingency test of Article 1 (e)), Article 9.1 (c) re-
quires only that the particular payment in question be "on the export," which the
Panel interpreted to mean, "in connection with" the export.249 Apparently, the
Appellate Body's view was that the Panel need not even have found the "pro-
gram as a whole" to be contingent, de facto or otherwise, upon export perform-
ance: "Article 9.1 sets forth a list of practices that, by definition, involve export
subsidies. In other words, a measure falling within Article 9.1 is deemed to be an
export subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 (e) of the Agreement on Agricul-
ture.
250
As to below-cost sales of C sugar beets to sugar processors, the Panel
found "the very close link" between production of C sugar and production of C
sugar beets, as well as the fact that C sugar must be exported as meeting the
lesser standard of Article 9.1 (c) that the government payments (here, in kind)
were "on the export" of C sugar.25" '
As to the cross subsidization of C sugar by high prices of domestic sales
of A and B sugar, the Panel concluded that the advantages it had found attribut-
able to C sugar were "on the export" of that sugar because C sugar was required
244. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 7.237-7.238.
245. Id. at 7.237.
246. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, at art. 9.1(c) (emphasis added).
247. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 7.273-7.275.
248. Id. at 7.273.
249. Id. The only case the Panel could find relevant to its interpretation was a reading of
the term, "on importation," by a Panel in India-Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, which
read the term as meaning "with regard to" or "in connection with," which would encompass meas-
ures that relate both directly and indirectly to importation. Panel Report India - Measures Affecting
the Automotive Sector, 7.257, WT/DS146/R, WT/DSI75/R (Apr. 5, 2002).
250. Appellate Body Sugar Report, supra note 197, at 269.
251. Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 117.276-7.277.
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to be exported. 2 The EC had argued that whatever advantages a sugar producer
received from the sugar regime would exist whether or not the producer exported
anything.253 The Panel found that this meant only that benefits were not "contin-
gent on" export performance, not that the payments had not been made "on the
export," that is, in connection with exportation.5 4
The EC would appear to have a point. As the United States argued as
third party, the panel has expanded the definition of export subsidy beyond, at
least in not making receipt of the benefit "contingent" on exportation, what was
agreed in Article 3 of the Subsidies Agreement. The United States believes the
same meaning was intended for Article 9.1 (c) of the Agreement on Agriculture,
despite the fact that the "contingency" test was not explicitly included. 5 Would
the cross subsidization of C sugar meet the contingency test? As the EC noted,
EC sugar producers receive no additional "payment" from the EC if they export a
large amount or no C sugar.256 On the other hand, if, as the Panel found, sugar
producers are able to sell C sugar above fixed costs, each sale covers the mar-
ginal costs of producing the sugar, thereby maintaining customer relationships,
scale efficiencies, and assurance to beet suppliers of a reliable outlet for their
production.257
In any event, the finding that the high prices for A quota and B quota
sugar cross subsidize C sugar exports substantially complicates the EC's task of
bringing its sugar regime into compliance with its reduction commitments under
the Agreement on Agriculture. If the 4 million tonnes of C sugar exports benefit
from export subsidies, either these exports must be eliminated or the subsidiza-
tion of them must be ended. The former approach will put the EU in breach of its
agreements with ACP countries and with India. The latter will be difficult, if
possible at all, without elimination of domestic support for A and B quota sugar,
because the Sugar opinions leave the EC with little guidance as what level of
domestic support would end C sugar cross-subsidization. As in the Cotton case,
the lack of quantification by dispute panels has left the losing WTO Member in a
position of not knowing how to bring its subsidy program into compliance.
252. Id. at 7.321-7.322.
253. Id. at 7.316.
254. Id. at 7.317.
255. WTO Issues Final Decision Finding EU Sugar Subsidies Exceed Quotas, WTO REP.
(BNA), (Sept. 9, 2004).
256. See Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 7.272 ("sugar producers may qualify for
A and B quota rights and privileges regardless of whether they produce C sugar for export").
257. See id. at 7.328-7.330.
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G. Application to United States Crops
EU sugar policy is generally regarded as providing to its growers some
of the highest sugar price supports in the world, either direct or indirect. EU
sugar policy distorts both world production and sugar prices. 58 In its absence,
world sugar prices would rise significantly.259 EU sugar producers receive bene-
fits from support which includes, as the Panel correctly notes, cross-price sub-
sidization for C sugar from A and B sugar.26 Many analysts would concur with
the economics upon which the Panel based its decision.
In contrast to the European Union, United States sugar policy consists of
mostly import quotas, which support producer prices above the so-called world
dumping market price. Although EC sugar policy provides far greater support
than does that of the United States, this difference is irrelevant because United
States sugar exports are minimal.26' On the other hand, United States program
commodities, such as rice, soybeans, and corn, are exported at prices below fully
allocated cost of production and benefit from a high degree of government sup-
port.262 If the Panel's straightforward causation test is applied to United States
rice policy, this situation may be sufficient to establish prohibited export subsidi-
zation for rice. The "very close link" between the domestic United States support
program and below-cost exports would place, for example, the United States rice
policy within the decision's ambit.
The Appellate Body took pains to rebut the EC's argument that the cross-
subsidization finding "blurs the distinction between domestic support and export
subsidies," a crucial distinction under both the Agreement on Agriculture and the
Subsidies Agreement. Noting that its "interpretation is based on the specific facts
and circumstances of this dispute," that is, that C sugar must be exported, the
Appellate Body protested that its decision indeed respects this important bound-
ary.263 United States commodity producers may take some comfort in this quali-
fication by the Appellate Body.
We noted earlier the Panel's suggestion that even high tariffs could be
considered a form of government subsidization. While we disagree, many
United States commodities are protected by high tariffs as well as quota restric-
tions and could thus be vulnerable to the Sugar Panel's reasoning.
258. Schmitz, supra note 172, at 193.
259. Id. at 211.
260. Id. at 196; Sugar Panel Report, supra note 8, at 7.3 10.
261. See Schmitz, supra note 172, at 193.
262. See Babcock, supra note 153, at 2.
263. Appellate Body Sugar Report, supra note 197, at 281-282.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented two interesting cases where Brazil challenged
through the WTO, the United States cotton policy, and the EU sugar policy.
Both have very different implications for United States farm policy. United
States sugar programs are unlikely to be affected because sugar is not exported
and does not receive direct domestic subsidies. However, the implications for
cotton and other commodities that receive direct government subsidies are far
reaching and may lead to additional challenges before the WTO. These decisions
pose serious threats to United States farm policy in its current form and substan-
tially change the balance of concessions and obligations as the Doha Round re-
negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture enters the critical stage of exchang-
ing offers.
